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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0000O0000

SALT LAKE CITY,

:
:
:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

:

CAROL S. GARCIA,

:
:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Case No. 950290-CA
Priority No.

Defendant/Appellant.

:
0000O0000

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

is

conferred

on

the

court

pursuant

to

Rule

26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (d)

(1995), whereby a defendant in a circuit court

criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals from a
final order on a misdemeanor offense.

In this case the Honorable

T. Patrick Casey, Judge Pro Tern, Third Circuit Court, in and for
Salt

Lake

County,

State of Utah, rendered

final

judgment

and

conviction for the offenses of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code
§ 12.24.100 (1995).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The relevant portion of the DUI statute under which Ms. Garcia
was convicted is reproduced here:

12.24.100

Driving under the influence of drugs and
intoxicants prohibited--Penalties.

A.
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person to operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this city if the person has a
blood or breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater by
weight as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle
within the city.
The fact that a person charged with
violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug does not constitute a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
Salt Lake Code § 12.24.100(A) (1995).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

IS THE HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS (HGN) TEST SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE THAT MUST MEET THE INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD
ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT?

II.

DID THE COURT ERR BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN
TEST WITHOUT REQUIRING THE CITY TO PRESENT EXPERT
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE TEST?

III. WAS THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN TEST RESULT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL?
These issues were preserved below.
13-37,

53

(text

of

pretrial

motion

See Trial Transcript pp.
hearing

and

citation

to

defendant's objection during trial).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In

reviewing

the

admissibility

of

a

scientific

test

a

reviewing court must determine if the evidence presented at trial
showed that the scientific principles and testing techniques meet
the

Utah

standard

of

inherent
2

reliability,

and

whether

the

scientific principles or techniques were properly applied to the
facts of the particular case by qualified persons.

State v.

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397, 398 n.7. (Utah 1989).
An appellate court reviews the denial of a defendant's motion
to suppress in a bifurcated manner, reviewing the trial court's
subsidiary
standard

and

and

factual

reviewing

determinations
its legal

under

clearly

conclusions

for correctness.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-39 (Utah 1994).
court

should

review

the

trial

court's

erroneous

On appeal, this

determination

that

the

evidence presented was insufficient to establish the reliability of
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test under a clearly erroneous
standard.

The question of whether HGN evidence

is scientific

evidence should be addressed under a correction of error standard.
Whether
reversible

the

admission

error depends

of

the

HGN

evidence

constitutes

on whether the admission

of the HGN

evidence was sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its
absence.

See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 361 (Utah 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 20, 1995, a jury found Ms. Garcia guilty of two
charges:

(1)

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol

(DUI) in

violation of Salt Lake Code 12.24.100, and (2) Driving Without a
License in violation of Salt Lake Code 12.24.010. Trial Transcript
121 (hereafter "Tr.").

Ms. Garcia was sentenced and judgment was
3

entered on March 27, 1995. On April 25, 1994, Ms. Garcia filed her
Notice of Appeal of the DUI conviction only.
Ms.

Garcia

appeals

her

conviction

for Driving

Under

the

Influence of Alcohol on the grounds that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by permitting the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN)
evidence to be presented without a foundation as to the reliability
of the test and the scientific principles underlying the test.

The

issue of whether HGN evidence is scientific evidence is a question
of first impression in Utah.

FACTS
1)

On March 5, 1994 at about 8:25 p.m., Officer David Warner

(Warner) observed a car driven by Carol Garcia heading westbound on
5th South and then turning southbound on State Street.

Warner

followed the car until it stopped at a light at 6th South and there
told Ms. Garcia to pull over.
between 6th and 7th South.

Ms. Garcia pulled over and stopped

Tr. 45-46.

Warner testified he saw no

driving violations by Ms. Garcia, i.e., no wide turns, no weaving,
no straddling lane lines, no following too closely, no drifting in
her lane, nor was she slow to respond to traffic signals.

Tr. 69-

73.
2)

Warner stated that he did observe two teenagers sitting

on the sunroof of the car with their legs inside the car.

Tr. 45.

Based on that observation Ms. Garcia was initially charged with
driving without a seatbelt; however, that charge was dismissed at
the request of the assistant city prosecutor before trial.
4

Tr. 1.

3)

Warner initially noted that Ms. Garcia was pleasant and

upbeat, and that she had normal

(not slurred) speech.

Tr. 49.

Warner also noted that Ms. Garcia had red eyes but admitted that
there are many causes of red eyes including allergy, fatigue, smoke
and pollution.
4)

Tr. 75.

Warner noted an odor of alcohol.

Tr. 48.

admitted drinking two beers earlier at a barbecue.

Ms. Garcia

Tr. 49. Officer

Williams later found an open can of beer under Ms. Garcia's seat.
Tr. 99.

Warner admitted that an odor of alcohol is not proof of

impairment and that even sober individuals who have just taken a
drink can have an odor of alcohol on their breath.
5)

Tr. 73-74.

Warner decided to administer some field sobriety tests.

The first test Ms. Garcia was ordered to perform was the horizontal
gaze nystagmus test (hereafter "HGN").
6)

During the trial Ms. Garcia objected to any evidence

about the HGN test being received without a prior foundation as to
the inherent reliability of the test.

Tr. 53.

In addition, after

the jury was selected but prior to the first witness, a hearing was
held on defendant's motion to exclude HGN evidence.

Tr. 13-37.

Ms. Garcia argued that HGN evidence is scientific evidence that
requires

the

prosecution

to

lay

a

foundation

reliability as a prerequisite to admission.
under

Rimmasch,

demonstrate:
reliable

Kofford

(1) that

indicator

of

and

Jackson,

nystagmus
an

of

the

individual's

of

inherent

Ms Garcia argued that
the

prosecution

eye

is

blood

an

alcohol

must

inherently
level

or

ability to safely operate a motor vehicle; (2) that the 3-part HGN
5

test

performed

by

Warner

is

an

inherently

reliable

means

of

measuring nystagmus of the eye, (3) that Officer Warner properly
performed the tests on this occasion, and (4) that Officer Warner
was sufficiently qualified to testify as to the test's result. Tr.
14.

Ms. Garcia argued that this foundation goes to admissibility

not merely to weight.

Tr. 13.

Ms. Garcia also argued that the

burden is entirely on the prosecution to establish the foundation
and

that

the

defense

was not

required

proffered evidence was unreliable.
7)

to establish

that

the

Tr. 14.

Warner stated he was first trained to do the HGN test in

1988 as part of an intoxilyzer recertification course and has used
it as much as 250 times per year since that

time.

Tr.

20-21.

Warner testified that he could not say whether the Salt Lake Police
Department has used the test continuously since that time.
8)

Tr. 20.

In administering the HGN test, Warner stated he held a

stimulus 12 to 15 inches in front of Ms. Garcia's eyes. 1

He then

moved the pen across Ms. Garcia's field of vision in about
seconds.

four

Warner was looking for three things as he administered

the HGN test: (1) the angle of onset of nystagmus 2 in each eye, (2)
lack

of

smooth

pursuit,

maximum deviation,

and

(3)

the

presence

of

nystagmus

at

(i.e., when the eye is moved as far as possible

1

In administering the HGN, Warner claims to have followed
the procedures outlined by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. No published verification of these procedures was
placed in the record.
2

Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball,
which may be horizontal, vertical or rotary. State v. Witte, 836
P.2d 1110, 1112 (Kan. 1992), citing Dorland's Illustrated Medical
Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974).
6

to one side).
9)

Tr. 54-56.

Warner noted that if the subject's head was not still the

person administering the test could not validate the test.

Tr. 27.

Warner testified that Ms. Garcia did not keep her head still and
that he did not use any sort of mechanical device to control her
head

movement,

but

that

he

satisfied with the result.

10)

keep

doing

the

test

until

he

was

Tr. 27.

When asked whether inaccurate estimation of the angles

involved would lead to a false positive test result, he stated:
"The test is no better than the person administering it."

Tr. 26.

Warner did not use a template or protractor to determine the angle
of onset, he just estimated the angle.

Tr. 26.

He testified that

using any sort of device to measure the angle of onset was "not
something that's ever been recommended for field work."
11)

Tr. 87.

Warner testified that he has never recorded and submitted

any of his tests for publication or review.
12)

Tr. 23, 86.

Warner testified that he has no personal knowledge of the

biomechanical

processes

produces gaze nystagmus.

by which

alcohol

Tr. 22-23.

medicine, opthamology, or neurology.

ingestion

supposedly

Warner has no degrees in
Tr. 23. Warner acknowledged

that nystagmus is caused by some illnesses and by substances other
than alcohol and that some people in the population exhibit natural
nystagmus.

Tr. 24-25.

13) . Warner testified that one study by the National Highway
Traffic

Safety

Administration

found

that,

even

when

used

in

conjunction with the Walk and Turn test, the HGN test was wrong at
7

least 20% of the time.
14)

Tr. 86.

Warner testified he did not know what the general opinion

of the scientific community might be of the HGN test.
15)

Tr. 24.

The trial judge took as stipulated the fact that Warner

is not familiar enough with scientific literature or studies to
discuss them professionally.

Tr. 15, 16 LL 10-11.

The judge found

that Officer Warner could not provide the type of expert testimony
required for the Frye test foundation.
16)

Tr. 35.

The prosecutor suggested the judge could take judicial

notice of the reliability of the HGN test on the basis of the
underlying science.

Tr. 34.

Judge Casey concluded that there was

no ba$is for taking judicial notice.
17)

Tr. 35.

Nevertheless, the trial court denied Ms. Garcia's motion

to exclude HGN evidence and allowed Warner to testify about the
result of Ms Garcia's test based on his personal experience in
administering the test.
18)

Warner testified that Ms. Garcia exhibited nystagmus in

both eyes on all three components of the test: lack of smooth
pursuit, distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation, and onset of
nystagmus before 45 degrees.

Tr. 54-57.

Warner testified that

this score indicated that Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol content was
.10 or greater.

Tr. 56; see also Tr. 21, 28.

Ms. Garcia refused

to take the breathalyzer test, so the HGN test result was the only
evidence adduced at trial that Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol content
exceeded the legal limit of .08.
(reproduced

supra).
8

See Salt Lake Code § 12.24.100

19). The next test given was the "Walk and Turn" test.
59.

Tr.

Ms. Garcia was asked to walk nine steps in a line, heel to

toe, with her hands at her sides, to watch her feet while walking
and count each step out loud, then to rotate and wake nine more
steps heel to toe back.

Tr. 60. Ms. Garcia complained of an ankle

injury but attempted to complete the test as asked.

Tr. 76.

During the "instructional stage" the individual is asked to stand
heel to toe.

Warner stated that if they have a problem, i.e., if

they lose balance a total of three times, this test is terminated.
Tr. 59. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia stepped to the side only one
time during the instructional phase. Tr. 59. Ms. Garcia correctly
walked nine steps, stayed on a straight line, did not start too
soon or stop to steady herself, was able to complete the test
without using her arms to balance, and touched heel to toe on all
but the 6th step.

Tr. 76-80.

Then she paused, turned and asked

Warner to clarify the test directions.
Garcia for not completing the test.
20)

Tr. 80. Warner failed Ms.

Tr. 80.

Warner then asked Ms. Garcia to perform

count" test.

Tr. 61.

the

"finger

Warner provides subjects the following

instructions: to touch the tip of each finger with their thumb,
counting that finger out loud; to start with their little finger up
to their index finger and back down, counting: one, two, three,
four, four, three, two, one; and to complete this cycle three
times.

Warner stated he looks for actual touching of fingers and

correct counting.

Tr. 62-63.

Ms. Garcia correctly touched her

fingers tip to tip and performed the test the correct number of
9

times.

Tr. 80.

Warner

stated

that Ms. Garcia

also

counted

correctly the first two times she did the test (i.e., 1234, 4321),
but counted 1234, 4231 the third time.

Warner admitted that other

than that she performed the test correctly.
the finger count is not a validated test.

Tr. 82.
Tr. 82.

He said that
He cautiously

admitted that "I wouldn't describe her performance on that test as
poor."

Tr. 83.

21) Then, Warner asked Ms. Garcia to perform the Romberg or
"head tilt and count" test.

Tr. 63.

This test requires the

subject to put their feet together and their arms down at their
side, to close their eyes and tilt their head back, and estimate
the passage of 3 0 seconds.

Tr. 63.

Warner stated that Ms. Garcia

swayed from side to side (but apparently did not lose her balance) ,
and that she stopped the test after nine seconds.
22)

Tr. 63.

At some point during the stop, Officer Roger Williams

(Williams) arrived on the scene.

Williams stated Ms. Garcia had

bloodshot eyes and an odor of alcohol.

Williams didn't recall

observing any particular field sobriety tests performed by Warner;
he stated that there was one test she couldn't do but didn't
remember which one it was.
23)
Tr. 89.

Tr. 97.

Williams performed a portable breath test on Ms. Garcia.
He testified that it showed that Ms. Garcia had consumed

some alcohol.

Tr. 89-90.

Judge Casey instructed the jury that the

mere consumption of alcohol prior to driving is not unlawful.

The

actual test result was not admitted into evidence because that test
has not been recognized as reliable and accurate.
10

Tr. 84.

24)

After the last field sobriety test, Warner placed Ms.

Garcia under arrest and asked her to submit to a chemical test.
Tr. 84-85.

Warner testified that when asked to submit to the test

Ms. Garcia stated: "Another one? No I won't take another one." Tr.
85.

And when informed of the consequences of refusing the test

(license suspension) Ms. Garcia responded: "What's the point.
license is suspended anyway."

My

Tr. 90.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test is widely deemed to
be based on scientific principles beyond the understanding of lay
jurors.

Utah law requires a foundation of the inherent reliability

of scientific evidence as a prerequisite to its admission.

The

evidence introduced in the court below shows that the HGN testing
procedure is fraught with fallibility.

After a pretrial hearing,

the judge found that the city was not able to establish through
Officer Warner's testimony either that the HGN test is inherently
reliable or that the test is generally accepted in the scientific
community as reliable.
The court's subsequent decision to allow the HGN evidence
despite

the

lack

of

foundation was

error.

The HGN

evidence

presented created a misleading aura of certainty regarding the
reliability

and

significance

of the evidence.

The error was

prejudicial in this case because Warner's HGN testimony was the
only testimony that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol content (BAC)
over the legal limit.

(Warner testified at trial that the HGN test
11

showed a BAC of .10 [grams by weight] or higher) . Without evidence
that Ms. Garcia had a BAC over the legal limit of .08, the city
would have had to prove she was incapable of safely operating a
motor vehicle.

The only evidence presented about Ms. Garcia's

ability to operate her vehicle was that she did so correctly.
Officer Warner noted no moving violations whatsoever.

Moreover,

the results of the other field sobriety tests were not particularly
incriminating.

Thus, absent the HGN testimony it is reasonably

likely the jury could have reached a result more favorable to Ms.
Garcia.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE HGN TEST IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND MUST MEET THE
INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT.
The

majority

of

the

jurisdictions

considering

the

admissibility of horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test results have
found the test to be based on scientific principles.

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that evidence based on scientific principles
requires

a

foundation

of

the

principles prior to admission.

"inherent

reliability"

of

the

In this case the trial court found

that the city failed to establish such a foundation.

A.

The HGN Test

Nystagmus is one of several types of abnormal ocular movements
defined as "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may
be horizontal, vertical, rotary, or mixed."
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State v. Witte, 836

P.2d 1110, 1112 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Dorland's Illustrated Medical
Dictionary 1068

(25th ed. 1974)).

The theory behind the gaze

nystagmus test is that there is a correlation between the amount of
alcohol a person consumes and the angle of onset of the nystagmus.
Id. (citing Carper & McCamey, Gaze Nystagmus:
DUI?,

Scientific

Proof

of

77 111. B.J. 146, 147 (1988)).
The Witte court outlined the procedures suggested by the 1984

NHTSA Study for administering the HGN test.

See National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, DOT-HS-806-512, Improved Sobriety
Testing
Litigation

(January

1984)

(found

at

2 Nichols,

Drinking/Driving

§ 26 app. A [1991]) (hereafter 1984 NHTSA Study).

The

officer should first ask the suspect to remove glasses or hard
contact lenses.

A suspect is then ordered to keep his head still

and to follow the stimulus -- usually a pen, flashlight, or the
officer's finger -- with his eyes only.

The officer then moves the

stimulus across the suspect's field of vision until the eye moves
to the extreme side.

The 1984 NHTSA Study recognizes that some

suspects will move their heads; the officer is thus instructed to
use a flashlight or his free hand for a chin rest. When conducting
the HGN, the officer looks for three signs in each eye: (1) angle
of onset occurring before 45 degrees in each eye; (2) ability of
the eye to follow the moving object smoothly; and (3) the presence
of moderate or distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation.
officer

finds

four

of

the

possible

six

clues,

then

If the
he

can

purportedly classify the suspect's blood alcohol content BAC as
above .10 percent.

Witte, 836 P.2d at 1111-12, citing 1984 NHTSA
13

Study, at 3-4.

This summary of the HGN test is similar to Officer

Warner's description of the HGN test he administered to Ms. Garcia.
See Summary of Relevant Facts, supra,
B.

9-19.

The HGN Test and its results are based on
scientific principles

The

majority

of

the

jurisdictions

considering

the

admissibility of HGN test results have found the test to be based
on scientific principles.

State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116

(Kan. 1992) ("The majority of jurisdictions that have considered
the issue have held that the HGN test is scientific evidence") ; see
also People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 332-33 (Cal. 1994) (en banc)
(HGN test is a novel scientific technique that requires evidence of
general acceptance in the scientific community); Ex Parte Malone,
575 So. 2d 106, 107 (Ala. 1990) (admission of HGN without showing
reliability

of

scientific

principles

upon

which

it

is

based

rendered admission of test results reversible error); State v.
Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 644-45 (W. Va. 1988) (error to admit HGN
test

without

evidence

of

both

the

general

acceptance

of

the

reliability of the test and the scientific principles on which it
is based); State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 856 (Mont. 1988) (HGN is
scientific evidence); State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb.
1986) (holding it error to admit HGN test -like polygraph test - as
scientific evidence without competent evidence that test is valid);
State v. O'Kev, 1994 WL 413239, *6-7 (Ore. July 7, 1995) (HGN rests
on scientific principles that, unlike other field sobriety tests,
are not within the realm of common knowledge); State v. Superior
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Court, 718 P.2d 171, 178 (Ariz. 1986) ("The HGN test is a different
type of test from balancing or walking a straight line because it
rests almost entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy
rather than a basis of common knowledge."); State v. Merritt, 647
A.2d

1021, 1026, 1028

(Conn. App. 1994)

("in

accord with the

majority of jurisdictions ... we conclude that the HGN test and its
results are based on a scientific principle"); State v. Cissne, 865
P. 2d 564, 569 (Wash. App. 1994) (holding it was reversible error to
admit HGN test results without foundational showing that test is
reliable and meets Frye standard); State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702,
704 (Mo. App. 1993) (requiring expert testimony regarding general
acceptance of HGN test in scientific community) ; Yell v. State, 856
P.2d

996,

996-97

(Okla.

Crim. App.

1993)

(HGN

is

scientific

evidence and requires proof that reliability of test has gained
general acceptance; police officer's testimony falls far short of
meeting standard); Foster v. State, 420 S.E.2d 78, 78 (Ga. App.
1992)

(HGN

acceptance

is
of

scientific
reliability

evidence
in

requiring

scientific

proof

of

community);

general
State

v.

Garrett, 811 P.2d 488, 490 (Id. 1991); Commonwealth v. Miller, 532
A. 2d 1186, 1188

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)

(HGN test requires expert

testimony of general acceptance of its validity).3
3

A minority of states hold that HGN is not scientific
evidence or apply standards for admissibility that are more liberal
than Utah's: State v. Sullivan, 426 S.E.2d766 (S.C. 1993); State
v. Bresson, 554 N.E.2d 1330 (Ohio 1990) (finding HGN different from
other scientific tests such as Polygraph test because no special
equipment required); State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Iowa
1990) (Iowa adopts liberal approach to admissibility of technical
information -- HGN test no more scientific than other field
sobriety tests); State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 856 (Mont. 1988)
15

C.

The city failed to show that the HGN Test met
the inherent reliability standard

HGN

evidence

prosecution

to

is

scientific

lay a foundation

prerequisite to admission.
not merely to weight.

evidence
of

that

inherent

requires

reliability

the
as a

This foundation goes to admissibility,

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah

1989) (sexual abuse profile testimony not allowed absent proof of
reliability of principles and techniques); Phillips v. Jackson, 615
P. 2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (foundation required prior to admission of

(applying a standard for admissibility described by the court as
less restrictive than Frye); Whitson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 794 (Ark.
1993) (holding HGN test not to be scientific but limiting testimony
to showing that alcohol was consumed).
Some courts have concluded that although HGN is scientific
evidence, the reliability of the HGN test is widely accepted so no
expert testimony is required: Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759
(Tex. Cr. App. 1994) (appellate court took judicial notice of the
reliability of both the theory underlying HGN tests and its
technique); City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 706 (N.D.
1994)
(appellate court took judicial notice from materials
submitted on appeal that the principles underlying the HGN test
were "widely accepted" and therefore required no expert testimony);
State v. O'Kev, 1994 WL 413239, *18 (Ore. July 7, 1995) (stating
that the HGN test is no longer novel) . The better view of the
novelty issue, however, is stated in People v. Leahy, 882 P. 2d 321,
332 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (noting that although HGN testing has
been in use for 3 0 years, "it has not been widely
applied
in
the
United
States
until
recently,"
i.e. about 1984; the court also
found that it would be "unjustified" "to hold that a scientific
technique could become immune from . . . scrutiny merely by reason of
long-standing and persistent use by law enforcement outside
the
laboratory or the courtroom").
Several courts have simply relied on the analysis of the
Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Superior Court, 718 P. 2d 171
(Ariz. 1986) (holding HGN to be scientific in nature but finding
that the evidence presented to the trial court met the Frye
standard); see, e.g. , State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488, 491 (Id.
1991); People v. Buening, 592 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (111. App.
1992); State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 887 (La. App. 1990). It
should be noted, however, that the Arizona case was an early case
decided before many of the articles and cases criticizing the
reliability of HGN testing were published.
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paternity tests as to reliability of both human leucocyte antigen
tests in general and of particular tests in each case) . The burden
is entirely on the prosecution to establish the foundation.
defense

is

unreliable.

not

obligated

to

prove

the

proffered

The Utah Supreme Court stated,

The

evidence

"The proponent of

scientific evidence that does not qualify for judicial notice must
make an initial foundational showing that convinces the trial court
that

the

principles

or

techniques

underlying

the

proffered

testimony meet Phillips' standard of inherent reliability before
the trial court can proceed to consider the normal foundational
questions appropriate to any expert testimony."
at 398

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d

(emphasis added), citing Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1236, and

Kof ford, 744 P. 2d at 1347.

In the absence of such an initial

showing, the evidence is to be excluded.

Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at

398.
The Rimmasch court noted the danger of admitting unproven
scientific principles:
One danger being guarded against is the tendency of the
finder of fact to abandon its responsibility to decide
the critical issues and simply adopt the judgment of the
expert despite an inability to accurately appraise the
validity of the underlying science.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396; see Merritt, 647 A.2d at 1028 (stating
that the mechanics of the HGN test, unlike those of other field
sobriety tests, are not within the common knowledge of lay jurors
and have the potential to mislead jurors).
The test for admissibility of scientific evidence is more
restrictive than for expert evidence generally.
17

The Utah Supreme

Court has made it clear that "regardless of how rule 702 phrases
the general test for the admissibility of expert testimony, our
case law superimposes a more restrictive test whenever scientific
evidence is at issue."
the inherent

Rimmasch. 775 P. 2d at 397.

reliability

requires announced

That test is

in Phillips.

Id.

Evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter of law,
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, and therefore, is inadmissible.

Id. at 397-98.

Moreover, a showing of the inherent reliability of the underlying
principles

or

techniques

must

be made

similarly grounded evidence is offered.

in each

case

in which

Id. at 398.

In Phillips, 615 P. 2d at 123 0, the Utah Supreme Court outlined
the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence noting
first the paradigm case in the field, Frve v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) .

The Court, in quoting Frve, stated:

scientific tests still in experimental stages should not
be admitted in evidence, but that scientific testimony
deduced from a 'well recognized scientific principle or
discovery7 is admissible if the scientific principle from
which the deduction is made is 'sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.'
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Frve, 293 F. at 1014). 4
4

Under federal case law, the Frye test is no longer
controlling. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that
the Frye test has been superseded by the adoption of the more
liberal Federal Rules of Evidence.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S.
, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469
(1993) . The Court particularly relied on Rule 702 governing expert
testimony explaining that " [n] othing in the text of this Rule [rule
702] establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite
to admissibility." Daubert, 509 U.S. at
, 113 S.Ct. at 2794,
125 L.Ed.2d at 479-80.
The argument that the adoption of Rule 702 superseded Utah's
18

The court went on to articulate a standard of admissibility
termed "inherent reliability" which maintains the basic framework
of the Frye standard:
Tests that have passed from the experimental stage
may be admissible if their reliability is reasonably
demonstratable.
An analysis of the admissibility of
scientific evidence, while taking into account general
scientific
acceptance
and
widespread
practical
application, must focus in all events on proof of
inherent reliability.
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (citations omitted).
The admissibility of scientific evidence may be presented in
two different ways:

(1) a request that the trial court take

judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the testimony's
foundational principle; or (2) a request for an evidentiary hearing
where evidence is presented in support or against the claim of
inherent reliability.

Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398.

In the first

instance, judicial notice, the proponent must demonstrate "a very
high level of reliability . . . " before a court may take judicial
notice

of

the

test's

scientific

Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d

reliability.

1343, 1348

Id; see,

(Utah 1987)

e.g.,

(scientific

scholars in relevant field unanimously agreed that HLA paternity
test is reliable).

test for the admissibility of scientific evidence has already been
raised and settled in Utah. In Rimmasch, the Utah Supreme Court
held that, in Utah, the test for admissibility of scientific
evidence is more restrictive than is the test for expert evidence
generally. The court made it clear that "regardless of how rule
702 phrases the general test for the admissibility of expert
testimony, our case law superimposes a more restrictive test
whenever scientific evidence is at issue." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at
397. That test is the inherent reliability standard announced in
Phillips. Id.
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In the case now at bar the prosecution failed to satisfy
either

of

the

admissibility.

two

methods

of

establishing

a

foundation

for

First, after an pretrial evidentiary hearing, Judge

Casey concluded that there was no basis for taking judicial notice.
Tr. 35.

Second, Officer Warner testified he did not know what the

general opinion of the scientific community might be of the HGN
test.

Tr. 24. Judge Casey took as stipulated the fact that Warner

was not familiar enough with scientific literature or studies to
discuss them professionally.

Tr. 15, 16 LL 10-11.

Warner did

testify to his own experience with the HGN test.

When asked

whether he had observed a correlation between the HGN test and a
person's BAC, he stated that when all the cues he looks for in the
HGN test are present, the person's BAC is .10 or higher.

Tr. 21.

Nevertheless, the judge found that Warner could not provide the
expert testimony required for the Frve test foundation.
II.

Tr. 35.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN
TEST WITHOUT REQUIRING THE CITY TO PRESENT EXPERT
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE
TEST
The

trial

court

erred by admitting

the HGN test

without a foundation of inherent reliability.

results

Under Utah law, the

proponent of scientific evidence must make an initial foundational
showing that convinces the trial court that the principles or
techniques

underlying

the

proffered

standard of inherent reliability.

testimony

meet

Phillips'

Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398. In

addition, the trial court must make a separate determination that
there is an adequate foundation for the proposed testimony, i.e.,
20

that the scientific principles or techniques have been properly
applied to the facts of the particular case by qualified persons
and that the testimony is founded on that work.

Id. at 3 98 n.7.

At trial, Ms. Garcia suggested that, based on Rimmasch, the
following foundational requirements would be required in regards to
HGN testimony:5
(1)
indicator

that
of

nystagmus
an

of

the

eye

individual's blood

is

an

alcohol

inherently

reliable

level or ability

to

safely operate a motor vehicle;
(2)

that

the

3-part

HGN

test

performed

by

Warner

is

an

inherently reliable means of measuring nystagumus of the eye,
(3) that Warner properly performed the tests on this occasion,
(4) that Warner was sufficiently qualified to testify as to
the test's result.
The prosecution failed to establish any such foundation.

Each

of the four factors is analyzed below.

A.

Nystagmus of the eye is not an inherently
reliable indicator of blood alcohol level or
ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.

The city presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent
reliability of the HGN test.

The only evidence presented at trial

to establish the reliability of the HGN came from arresting officer
5

Tr. 14. See also State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1111, 1117
(Kan. 1992) (requiring initial foundation that: (1) nystagmus of
the eye is, in fact, an indicator of alcohol consumption to the
degree that it influences or impairs the ability to drive, (2) the
method used to test HGN is a valid test to measure or perceive that
phenomenon); see also Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235
(Utah 1980) (enumerating elements required for foundation for the
admissibility of paternity tests).
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Warner.

Most courts have determined that police officers do not

have the specialized scientific training to testify about the HGN
test's scientific reliability.

People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 334

(Cal. 1994) (en banc) (court agreed with "the weight of authority"
that police officer testimony is insufficient to establish general
acceptance).6
The California

Court of Appeals explained

the problem of

allowing police officers with no scientific expertise to state
their opinion regarding the relationship between alcohol ingestion
and HGN:
[HGN] rests on scientific premises well beyond [the
officer's] knowledge, training, or education. Without
some understanding of the processes by which alcohol
ingestion produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation
is, how other possible causes might be masked, what
margin of error has been shown in statistical surveys,
and a host of other relevant factors, his opinion on
causation, notwithstanding his ability to recognize the
symptom, was unfounded.
Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he horizontal gaze nystagmus test is distinguished
from other field sobriety tests in that science, rather than common
knowledge, provides the legitimacy for horizontal gaze nystagmus
6

See, e.g., State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1992)
(foundation of general acceptance in scientific community required
in addition to qualifications of the officer administering the
test); State v. Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1988) (error to
admit HGN when only testimony was from arresting officer) ; State v.
Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986) (arresting officer, who
received training through police-sponsored seminar, not qualified
to testify as expert witness to verify reliability of test); Yell
v. State, 856 P.2d 996, 996-97 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (HGN is
scientific evidence and requires proof that reliability has gained
general acceptance; police officer's testimony falls far short of
meeting standard).
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testing."

State v. Witte. 836 P.2d 1110, 1111, 1115 (Kan. 1992).

In sum, police officers lack the scientific

training

and

expertise necessary to validate the scientific principles upon
which the HGN is premised.

Although a police officer may testify

as to his observations, those observations do not validate the
underlying scientific principle.

See Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1236

(laboratory technician who completed basic workup on paternity
blood tests not qualified to testify with respect to scientific
validity of test).
In the case now at bar, Officer Warner admitted that he has no
personal knowledge of the biomechanical processes by which alcohol
ingestion supposedly produces gaze nystagmus.

Tr. 22-23.

has no degrees in medicine, opthamology, or neurology
fields

familiar

with

neurological

malfunction

of

Warner
(medical

smooth

eye

tracking patterns caused by alcohol or other neurological causes
which may result in nystagmus).

Tr. 23.

Officer Warner also

testified that he did not know what the general opinion of the
scientific community might be of the HGN test.

Tr. 24.

The trial

judge took as stipulated the fact that Warner was not familiar
enough

with

scientific

professionally.

literature

or

Tr. 15, 16 L 10-11.

studies

to discuss

them

Judge Casey determined that

Officer Warner was not qualified to establish the requirements for
the admission of scientific evidence.

Tr. 35.

The prosecutor also suggested the judge could take judicial
notice of the reliability of the HGN test on the basis of the
underlying science.

Tr. 34.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated
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that a "very high level of reliability is required before judicial
notice

can

be

taken."

Rimmasch,

775

P. 2d

at

398.

After

considering the evidence presented below Judge Casey concluded that
there was no basis for taking judicial notice.
added).

Tr. 35. (emphasis

Furthermore, any studies or cases presented on appeal are

insufficient

to allow the court to take judicial notice.

Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1236

See

(articles submitted by proponent of

paternity test not sufficient, in absence of expert testimony, to
determine as matter of law that paternity test has achieved general
acceptance in scientific community).
The HGN test

has not achieved

scientific community.

general

acceptance

in the

In State v. Witte, 836 P. 2d 1110

(Kan.

1992), the Kansas Supreme Court found that "[t]he reliability of
the

HGN

test

is

not

scientific community."

currently

a

settled

proposition

in

the

Witte, 836 P.2d at 1119 (emphasis added).

The court added, " [o]ur research shows that the reaction within the
scientific community is mixed."

Id. (emphasis added).

The court

concluded that HGN did not meet the foundational requirements for
admissibility of scientific evidence.
reviewed

a

number

of

scientific

Id.

In addition, the court

articles

that

question

the

scientific reliability of the HGN test and which recognize division
within the scientific community regarding the reliability of the
HGN test.7

See also Leahy, 882 P.2d at 335 (agreeing with Witte);

7

Those articles include Cowan & Jaffe, Proof and Disproof of
Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Throucrh Evidence of Observable
Intoxication and Coordination Testing, 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d
459 §12 (1990);
Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo
Science, 2 DWI Journal 1, 3-4 (1987); Rouleau, Unreliability of
24

Cissne, 865 P.2d at 568 & n.5
B.

The 3-part HGN test performed by Warner is not
an inherently reliable means of measuring
nystagmus of the eye.

The second foundational requirement is proof of the accuracy
and

reliability

of

the methods utilized

in HGN

testing.

In

administering the HGN test, Warner stated he held a pen 12-15
inches in front of Ms. Garcia's eyes.
Ms. Garcia's field of vision.

He then moved the pen across

Warner was looking for three things

as he administered the test: (1) the angle of onset of nystagmus in
each eye,

(2) lack of smooth pursuit, and

(3) the presence of

nystagmus at maximum deviation, (i.e., when the eye is moved as far
as possible to one side).

Tr. 54-56.

There are several indications that the test used by Officer
Warner

in

this

case

is

not

inherently

reliable.

First,

a

fundamental part of the HGN test requires the officer to identify
the angle of onset of nystagmus.

The failure to use any device to

measure the critical angles leads to inconsistent and inaccurate
results.

See 2 Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation § 26:01, at 4

(1991) .

When asked whether inaccurate estimation of the angles

involved would lead to a false positive test result, Warner stated:
"The test is no better than the person administering it."

Tr. 26.

Warner did not use a template or protractor to determine the angle
of onset, he just estimated the angle.

Tr. 26.

He testified that

Horizontal Gaze JNyst'agmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439 §
7, p. 452 (1989); 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases §§ 8A:06,
8A:08 (3d ed. 1992); 2 Nichols, Drinking/ Driving Litigation §
26:01 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
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using any sort of device to measure the angle of onset was "not
something that's ever been recommended for field work."

Tr. 87.

Moreover, there is disagreement among authorities as to what
is the correct angle of onset.

The Witte court reviewed several

studies questioning the reliability of HGN testing:
Other researchers disagree that 45 degrees is the
appropriate angle of onset. According to one authority,
50-60 percent of sober individuals who deviate their eyes
more than 4 0 degrees to the side will exhibit nystagmus,
and this nystagmus cannot be distinguished from alcohol
gaze nystagmus.
Another researcher suggests the
threshold appearance of HGN in most individuals is
observed at a 40-degree angle with a BAC reading of .06
percent. Still another researcher contends individuals
with a BAC reading of .10 do not exhibit nystagmus until
the eye is deviated to a 51 degree angle.
Witte,

836

P.2d

at

1119

(internal

citations

omitted);

see

2

Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation § 26:01, at 3 (1991).
A second problem with the field-administered HGN test is that
apparently no device is used to keep the test subject's head still
during the test.

Warner testified that if the subject's head

wasn't still the person administering the test could not validate
the test.

Tr. 27.

Warner testified that Ms. Garcia did not keep

her head still and that he did not use any sort of mechanical
device to control her head movement, but that he kept doing the
test until he was satisfied with the result.

Tr. 27.

The Witte

court also noted concerns about estimating the angle of onset:
The NHTSA agrees the angle of lateral deviation is
critical. Despite the fact that the NHTSA obtained its
research results through the use of mechanical devices
that "hold the head in a stable position and precisely
measure the angle of lateral deviation of the eye," the
NHTSA instructs officers to estimate the 45-degree angle.
A visual estimate of the angle would seem to cause
inaccurate and inconsistent results.
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Witte, 836 P. 2d at 1119-20

(internal citations omitted) .

Head

movement will affect the officer's estimation of angle of onset,
thus affecting the result of the test.

See Rouleau, Unreliability

of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d
439 (1989).
Third, NHTSA's definition of nystagmus can lead to confusion.
The final manual produced by NHTSA to instruct law enforcement
officials defines nystagmus as a jerking of the eyes.
Study,

at

2.

Given

NHTSA's

overly

simplistic

1984 NHTSA

definition,

a

layperson could mistake the quick saccadic jerks that the eyeball
makes while tracking a moving object, such as the object used by
the examiner during the HGN test, for nystagmus.

Drinking/Driving
Relationship

Litigation
Between

identifying

§ 26:01, at 4, citing Rashbass, The

Saccadic

and Smooth Tracking

Eye Movements, J.

(1961), and Robinson, Eye Movement

Physiology 159:326
Primates,

2 Nichols,

Science

161:1219

nystagmus

(1968).

is noted

Another

in the

Control

problem

1984 NHTSA

in
with

Study where

officers are instructed to "be sure that the jerkiness was not due
to your moving the object in a jerky manner."

1984 NHTSA Study at

4.
Fourth, Warner acknowledged that nystagmus has other causes.
He testified that nystagmus is caused by some illnesses and by
substances

other

than

alcohol

and

population exhibit natural nystagmus.

that

some

people

Tr. 24-25.

in

the

He did not

testify how he was able to distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other
forms of nystagmus.
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Various scientific studies describe other factors that may
cause nystagmus.

The Witte court noted research indicating that

nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol nystagmus can be caused by
problems

with

inner

ear

labyrinth,

influenza,

streptococcus,

vertigo, measles, syphilis, arteriosclerosis, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, hypertension, motion sickness, sunstroke, eye
muscle

fatigue,

glaucoma,

caffeine,

nicotine,

aspirin,

poor

lighting conditions, and an individual's circadian rhythms. Witte,
836 P.2d at 1120 (internal citations omitted).
In summary, the HGN test as administered

in the field is

fraught with fallibility. According to the Warner's testimony, the
tester never uses any device to measure angles that are critical to
the test result. Moreover, there is significant dispute as to what
exactly are the critical angles and as to how to interpret the
results.

In addition, no device

is used

to hold

the

tested

person's head still, which exacerbates the problem of determining
angles.

Finally, there are several other causes of nystagmus --

indistinguishable by the roadside HGN test
accuracy of the test.

-- that affect the

The field-administered HGN test is simply

not an inherently accurate method of measuring gaze nystagmus.
C.

The HGN test performed in this case was not
performed in accordance with proper procedures
nor equipment.

Warner did not use satisfactory procedures and equipment when
performing the HGN test in this case.

Even if he followed the

procedures for conducting roadside HGN tests that he was taught at
police-school, the results would not be inherently reliable.
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See

II. B.

supra.

First, he did not

subject's head still.

use

any device

to keep

the

Warner testified that if the subject's head

wasn't still the person administering the test could not validate
the test.

Tr. 27.

Warner testified that Ms. Garcia did not keep

her head still and that he did not use any sort of mechanical
device

to

control

determination

of

her
the

head
angle

movement.
of

onset

Tr.
is

such

27.

Because

a

sensitive

measurement, the failure to use a device to anchor the head raises
concerns about the accuracy of the test.
Second, Warner did not use any device to measure the critical
angles.

Warner stated that he did not use a template or protractor

to determine the angle of onset, he just estimated the angle.
26.

Tr.

Whatever validity the HGN test may have can be destroyed if

proper conditions and procedures are not established.8

Warner's

failure to use a head restraint combined with his failure to use a
protractor or other device to accurately record the angle of onset
exacerbated the deficiencies of the HGN test in this case.
D.

Warner's experience in administering the HGN
test is insufficient foundation.

Warner stated he was first trained to do the HGN test in 1988
as part of an intoxilyzer certification course and has used it as
8

Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1354 (Utah 1987) (stating
that " [t]he validity of HLA tests can be destroyed if proper
conditions and procedures are not established.").
Compare the
elaborate 15-step testing protocol established for HLA testing and
note the court's holding that "before HLA test results can be
admitted in a paternity trial, evidence must be produced that the
particular tests relied upon in the case were conducted as
specified by the Standards or in an equally reliable manner[.]"
Id. at 1354-56.
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much as 250 times per year since that time.
testified

Tr. 20-21.

Warner

that he could not say whether the Salt Lake

Police

Department has used the test continuously since that time. Tr. 20.
Warner's

apparent

experience

in administering

the HGN

meaningless without a reliable test properly performed.
Casey

found

that

Officer

Warner

was

unable

to

is

Judge

establish

a

foundation as to the reliability of the principles underlying the
HGN

test.

Moreover,

reliability

of HGN

the

substantial

field-testing

problems

procedures

affecting

generally

and

the
the

serious flaws with the way the test was performed in this case make
the

test

results

even

more

suspect.

Therefore,

because

the

necessary foundation for the admission of HGN tests was not met in
this case, Ms. Garcia asks this court to remand this case for a new
trial.
III. THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
REQUIRING REMAND.
The lower court committed reversible error when it allowed the
admission of HGN evidence without a foundation as to the inherent
reliability of the principles and procedures underlying the test.
See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d 388

(Utah 1989)

(reversing and

remanding based on erroneous admission of sexual abuse profile
evidence without foundation of reliability); Phillips v. Jackson,
615 P. 2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (reversing and remanding based on lack of
foundation for human leucocyte antigen testing); People v. Leahy,
882

P. 2d

321

(Cal.

1994)

(en

banc)

(affirming

reversal

of

defendant's conviction and remanding for Frye-type hearing as to
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whether HGN testing is generally accepted as reliable); State v.
Witte. 836 P. 2d 1110

(Kan. 1992)

(holding that admission of HGN

test result was prejudicial error and remanding for new trial) .
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that in order for an error to
constitute
prejudicial

reversible
that

error,

there

is

a

the

error

reasonable

must

be

sufficiently

likelihood

favorable result for the defendant in its absence.

of

a

more

See State v.

Young, 853 P.2d 327, 361 (Utah 1993).
To prove
Alcohol

the elements

of Driving Under

the

Influence

of

(DUI) the prosecution had to establish either that Ms.

Garcia was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while
having a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater; or

that she was

under the influence of alcohol to the degree that she was incapable
of safely driving a motor vehicle.

Salt Lake Code § 12.24.100.

The error of admitting HGN evidence was prejudicial in this case
because Warner's HGN testimony was the only evidence presented that
Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol level was over the legal limit of .08.
The evidence introduced against Ms. Garcia at trial can be
marshalled

into

four

general

categories:

(1) Driving

pattern

evidence, (2) Initial observations, (3) Field sobriety tests, (4)
Breath test evidence. A review of this evidence shows that, in the
absence of the HGN test, it is reasonably likely a jury would have
found Ms. Garcia not guilty of DUI.
A.

Ms. Garcia's driving pattern indicates that
she was capable of driving safely.

Ms. Garcia did not commit any moving violations.
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On March 5,

1994 at about 8:25 p.m., Officer David Warner (Warner) observed a
car driven by Carol Garcia heading westbound on 5th South and then
turning southbound on State Street.

Warner followed the car until

it stopped at a light at 6th South and there told Ms. Garcia to
pull over.
South.

Ms. Garcia pulled over and stopped between 6th and 7th

Tr. 45-46.

Warner testified he saw no driving violations

by Ms. Garcia, i.e., no wide turns, no weaving, no straddling lane
lines, no following too closely, no drifting in her lane, not slow
to respond to traffic signals.

Tr. 69-73.9

Driving pattern evidence is critical in this case because
there was no breath test showing whether Ms. Garcia was over or
under the legal limit of

.08.

Where a driver is over

.08 no

driving pattern evidence is necessary; the driver has committed a
per

se violation of the DUI law.

However, where as here, there is

no breath test, the prosecution must prove that the driver is
incapable

of

driving

safely.

In such cases, driving

evidence is extremely significant.
incapable

pattern

If Ms. Garcia were in fact

of driving safely, it is likely she would have committed

some driving error.

Since she committed no driving error, in the

absence of the HGN testimony that she had a blood alcohol level of
.10 or higher, it is reasonably likely the jury would have found
her not guilty of DUI.

9

Warner stated that he stopped the car because he observed
two teenagers sitting on the sunroof of the car with their legs
inside the car. Tr. 45. Based on that observation Ms. Garcia was
initially charged with a seatbelt violation; however, that charge
was dismissed at the request of the city prosecutor before trial.
Tr. 1.
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B.

Warner's initial observations are inconclusive at most.

Warner intially noted that Ms. Garcia was pleasant and upbeat;
and he stated that she had normal (not slurred) speech.

Tr. 49.

Warner also noted that Ms. Garcia had red eyes but admitted that
there are many causes of red eyes including allergy, fatigue, smoke
and pollution.

Tr. 75.

Warner noted an odor of alcohol. Tr. 48. Ms. Garcia admitted
drinking two beers earlier at a barbecue.

Tr. 49. Officer Williams

later found an open can of beer under Ms. Garcia's seat.

Tr. 99.

Warner admitted that an odor of alcohol is not proof of impairment
and that even sober individuals who have just taken a drink can
have an odor of alcohol on their breath.

Tr. 73-74.

In addition,

the judge gave the jury an instruction that the mere consumption of
alcohol is not unlawful.

See jury instructions.

At some point during the traffic stop, Officer Roger Williams
(Williams) arrived on the scene.

Williams stated Ms. Garcia had

bloodshot eyes and that he noted an odor of alcohol.

Williams did

not recall observing any particular field sobriety tests performed
by Warner; he stated that he thought there was one test she could
not do but did not remember which one it was.
C.

Tr. 97.

Field sobriety tests, (excluding the HGN
test) , do not show Ms. Garcia either had a BAC
over .08 or was incapable of safely driving.

The first field sobriety test (FST) given Ms. Garcia was the
HGN test.

Warner testified that based on his experience the HGN

test indicated that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol level of .10 or
higher.

Tr. 56; see also Tr. 21, 28. Thus, the HGN evidence could
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have been sufficient in itself for the jury to find Ms. Garcia
guilty as charged.
The next test given was the "Walk and Turn" test.

Tr. 59.

Ms. Garcia was asked to walk nine steps in a line, heel to toe,
with her hands at her sides, to watch her feet while walking and
count each step out loud, then to rotate and wake nine more steps
heel to toe back.

Tr. 60.

Ms. Garcia complained of an ankle

injury but attempted to complete the test as asked.

Tr. 76.

During the "instructional stage" the individual is asked to stand
heel to toe.

Warner stated that if they have a problem, i.e., if

they lose balance a total of three times, this test is terminated.
Tr. 59. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia stepped to the side only one
time during the instructional phase. Tr. 59. Ms. Garcia correctly
walked nine steps, stayed on a straight line, did not start too
soon or stop to steady herself, was able to complete the nine steps
without using her arms to balance, and touched heel to toe on all
but the 6th step.

Tr. 76-80.

Then she paused, turned and asked

Warner to clarify the test directions.
Garcia for not completing the test.

Tr. 80.

Warner failed Ms.

Tr. 80.

Warner then asked Ms. Garcia to perform the "finger count"
test.

Tr.

61.

Warner

provides

subjects

the

following

instructions: to touch the tip of each finger with their thumb,
counting that finger out loud; to start with their little finger up
to their index finger and back down, counting: one, two, three,
four, four, three, two, one; and to complete this cycle three
times.

Warner stated he looks for actual touching of fingers and
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correct counting.

Tr. 62-63.

Ms. Garcia correctly touched her

fingers tip to tip and performed the test the correct number of
times.

Tr. 80.

Warner

stated

that Ms. Garcia also

counted

correctly the first two times she did the test (1234, 4321), but
counted 1234, 4231 the third time. Warner admitted that other than
that she performed the test correctly.

Tr. 82.

He cautiously

admitted that "I wouldn't describe her performance on that test as
poor."

Tr. 83.

Finally, Warner asked Ms. Garcia to perform the Rhomberg or
"head tilt and count" test.

Tr. 63. This test required Ms. Garcia

to put her feet together and her arms down at her side, to close
her eyes and tilt her head back, and estimate the passage of 3 0
seconds.
to side

Tr. 63.

Warner stated that Ms. Garcia swayed from side

(but apparently did not lose her balance) , and that she

stayed in this unnatural and uncomfortable posture for only nine
seconds.
D.

Tr. 63.
No breath test indicating Ms. Garcia's BAC was obtained.

After the last field sobriety test, Warner placed Ms. Garcia
under arrest and asked her to submit to a chemical test.
85.

Tr. 84-

Warner testified that when asked to submit to the test Ms.

Garcia stated: "Another one? No I won't take another one."
85.10

Tr.

And when informed of the consequences of refusing the test
10

Sometime during her field sobriety tests, Officer Williams
performed a portable breath test on Ms. Garcia.
Tr. 89.
He
testified that it showed that Ms. Garcia had consumed some alcohol.
Tr. 89-90.
Judge Casey instructed the jury that the mere
consumption of alcohol prior to driving is not unlawful. See jury
instructions.
The actual test result was not admitted into
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(license suspension) Ms. Garcia responded: "What's the point.
license is suspended anyway."

My

Tr. 90.

Prosecutors sometimes argue that refusal to take as many tests
as the police may request is evidence of guilt.
prosecutor

argued

that

Ms. Garcia

could

innocent by taking another breath test.

In this case the

have

proved

Tr. 116-17.

herself
Garcia's

refusal was understandable under the circumstances, however.

Not

only had she already taken one breath test, she knew that her
license was already suspended.

Thus, evidence of her refusal to

take the second test in this case is not particularly probative.
E.

Summary of the evidence

Warner's HGN testimony was the only direct evidence that Ms.
Garcia had violated the city's DUI code. Warner testified that the
HGN test showed a BAC of .10 or higher, well over the legal limit
of .08. That testimony was perhaps determinative.

In the absence

of the HGN testimony, the city would have had to prove Ms. Garcia
was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.

See Salt Lake

evidence because the portable breath test has not been recognized
as reliable and accurate. Tr. 84. The Utah Code provides that
"the Department of Public Safety shall establish standards for the
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a
person's breath...."
Utah Code Ann. § 44-6-44.3(1).
The
Department of Public Safety complied and made a rule that "all
breath testing instruments ...to be used for evidentiary purposes
must be certified by brand and/or model by the DPS [Department of
Public Safety]." Utah Admin. Code R14-500-5(A). The DPS has not
certified the hand-held machine used by police officers to do
breath tests in the field.
The test was only admitted at all to explain testimony the
defense elicited on cross-examination that, when asked to take the
breath test, Ms. Garcia answered "Another test. No, I won't take
another test." Tr. 85, 89-90.
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Code 12.24.100.

The only evidence presented about Ms. Garcia's

ability to operate her vehicle was that she did so correctly.
Warner noted no moving violations whatsoever.

Because there was no

evidence of any moving violations, it would be very difficult
(absent the HGN test) for the jury to find Ms. Garcia incapable of
safely operating her vehicle.
Moreover, the results of the other field sobriety tests are
not particularly compelling.

Ms. Garcia's small deviations from

difficult and unnatural tests are not particularly compelling proof
of DUI.

Similarly, evidence of Ms. Garcia's

refusal to take a

second breath test are understandable given she had already taken
one test and given that she was aware that her license was already
suspended.

Thus, without the HGN testimony that Ms. Garcia had a

BAC of .10 or higher, it is reasonably likely the jury would have
found her not guilty.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
No Utah appellate court has yet addressed the issue of whether
HGN evidence is scientific evidence.11
raised

in

Utah

inconsistently.12

trial

courts,

The issue is frequently

however,

In order to assure

and

is

that Utah's

dealt
DUI

with

law

is

11

See State v. Strausbercr, Case No. 940241-CA, slip. op. at
5, n.3 (Utah App. May 4, 1995) (noting "We do not reach the
question of whether or not the trial court erred by admitting the
HGN evidence.").
12

The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) alone handled
578 DUI cases in Salt Lake County in 1994. An informal survey of
the attorneys in the misdemeanor division of the LDA indicates that
the judges in the Third Circuit are fairly evenly divided as to
whether they allow HGN evidence as evidence of DUI.
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applied equally and fairly to all defendants, Ms. Garcia urges this
court to resolve the issue with a written opinion on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Garcia asks the court to find
that:

(1)

the

HGN

test

is

scientific

evidence

subject

to

a

preliminary determination by the trial court as to whether the
evidence meets Utah's inherent reliability test,

(2) the trial

court erred by allowing the arresting officer to testify as to the
HGN test and its results without a prior foundation of the inherent
reliability of the test and the principles underlying the test, (3)
the arresting officer was not qualified to validate the scientific
principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion
and nystagmus, and (4) the admission of the HGN test results in
this case without the proper foundation was error requiring remand
for a new trial.

DATED this so1

day of August, 19 95.

R A L ^ DtftLAPTANA
Attorney for Appellant
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